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PATENT INFRINGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT: GAO'S ROLE
J. EDWARD WELCH* t
Serious problems have existed for a number of years in connection
with the award and performance of Government contracts and the
handling of administrative claims where infringement of patent rights
is or might be involved. These problems have been dealt with generally
and authoriatively in several law review articles and articles in other
publications.1
This article has a twofold purpose. First, to explain why, in the
author's opinion, the General Accounting Office (GAO) feels that
the Government should be and is free under existing law to utilize a
patented invention under a Government contract without a license
from the owner to whom the Government- has granted the patent.
Second, to show that a patent owner who believes his patent has been
used in the performance of a Government contract cannot (success-
fully) seek relief before the GAO or the administrative contracting
agencies who have not been specifically authorized to grant such relief.
Also, related matters involving patent indemnification, authorization
and consent, and proposed legislation, as viewed from the standpoint
of Comptroller General decisions, will be discussed.
HISTORY AND STATUs OF APPLICABLE LAw
To understand more clearly the basis for these problems, it might
be well to trace briefly the evolution of the pertinent laws and decisions
as they apply in this area.
Prior to 1910, it was recognized that when the United States Gov-
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; A.B., 1932, University of Maryland; J.D., 1939,
Georgetown University Law Center; Deputy General Counsel, United States General
Accounting Office.
t The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent the official views of the General Accounting Office.
1. See, e.g., Mosinghoff and Allnut, Patent Infringement in Government Procurement:
A Remedy Without a Right?, 42 Nontm DAam LAw 5 (1966); Rotondi and Doblin,
Government Competitive Procurement and Patent Infringement: Substance and Solu-
tion, 27 FwD. B. J. 325 (1967); TeSelle, Authorization or Consent to Infringe Patents
in Production for the Government, 26 Gao. WAsK. L. REV. 583 (1958).
[391
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ernment made use of a patented invention without a valid license, it was
acting as an infringer liable in tort to the patent owner. However,
because the Government exercised its right of immunity from suit as
a sovereign, the patent owner was left without a remedy, except through
special bill in Congress. To remedy this situation, Congress passed the
Act of June 25, 1910,2 which provided generally that where the United
States made use of a patented invention without lawful right, the owner
might recover reasonable compensation for such use by suit in the Court
of Claims. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court established that the
Act of 1910 made full and adequate provisions for the Government to
obtain a license under patents through eminent domain and that a suit
to enjoin the exercise of that right would not lie where the Govern-
ment itself was utilizing a patented invention.3
However, in a later case the Supreme Court ruled that the provisions
of the Act of 1910 did not extend to a contractor who violated a valid
patent in the course of his Government contract work and held that
an injunction against such contractor would lie.4 This ruling led to the
Act of July 1, 1918,1 which amended the earlier Act to prevent injunc-
tive interference with Government work conducted by private con-
tractors. The 1918 amendment has been codified as section 1498 of
title 28, United States Code, and is generally referred to simply as
"9section 1498."
Subsection (a) of section 1498 provides in pertinent part:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of
the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United
States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use
or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action
against the United States in the Court of Claims for the recovery
of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and man-
ufacture.
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or
corporation for the Government and with the authorization or
consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or manu-
facture for the United States.
2. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851.
3. Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U.S. 290 (1912).
4. Cramp & Sons v. Curtis Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28 (1918).
5. 28 U.S.C. 1498(a) (1964), formerly 40 Star. 705 (1918).
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The reason for including Government contractors as well as the
Government itself within the coverage of the amendment was that
urgent procurements by the Government were subject to delay by
injunctive suits against its contractors and that manufacturers were
exposed to expensive litigation and were reluctant to take contracts
which might result in such severe consequences as prohibitive injunc-
tions, payment of royalties and punitive damages.
The legislative history of section 1498 makes it clear that the statute's
purpose was to furnish the patent owner an adequate and effective
remedy while protecting the Government from having its procure-
ments delayed and thwarted while private parties carried on drawn-
out litigation.6 In a 1928 decision the Supreme Court, after reviewing
6. Wood v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 296 F. 718, 720 (S.D. Ala. 1924). Letter from
Franklin D. Roosevelt as Acting Secretary of Navy to Senator Benjamin R. Tillman,
Chairman of then Committee of Naval Affairs, April 20, 1918, set forth in the Wood
decision at pages 720 and 721, reads:
My Dear Senator Tillman: This department is confronted with a difficult
situation as the result of a recent decision by the Supreme Court affecting
the government's rights as to the manufacture and use of patented inven-
tions, and it seems necessary that amendment be made of the Act of June
25, 1910, entitled "An act to provide additional protection for the owners
of patents of the United States, and for other purposes.' The case in which
the court's decision was rendered is that of William Cramp & Son's Ship
& Engine Building Co., Petitioner, v. International Curtis Marine Turbine
Co. and Curtis Marine Turbine Co. of the United States, and the decision
is, in effect, so far as it is of importance here, that a contractor for the
manufacture of a patented article for the government is not exempt, unless
he is only a contributory infringer, from injunction and other interference
through litigation by the patentee.
A prior decision of the Supreme Court, that in the case of Crozier v.
Krupp, had been interpreted as having the opposite meaning, and the de-
partment was able up to the time of the later decision, on March 4 last,
to proceed satisfactorily with the procuring of such patented articles as it
needed, leaving the matter of compensation to patentees for adjustment by
direct agreement, or, if necessary, by resort to the Court of Claims under
the above-mentioned act of 1910. Now, however, manufacturers are exposed
to expensive litigation, involving the possibilities of prohibitive injunction
payment of royalties, rendering of accounts, and payment of punitive dam-
ages, and they are reluctant to take contracts that may bring such severe
consequences. The situation promised serious disadvantage to the public
interests, and in order that vital activities of this department may not be
restricted unduly at this time, and also with a view of enabling dissatisfied
patentees to obtain just and adequate compensation in all cases conformable
to the declared purpose of said act, I have the honor to request that the act
be amended by the insertion of a proper provision therefor in the pending
naval appropriation bill....
Similarly, Congressman Padgett explained to the House of Representatives the purpose
1968]
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the legislative history of section 1498, stated that the basic Act, as
amended, effected an assumption of liability by the Government, there-
by precluding litigation against the actual infringer. In effect, this re-
lieved him entirely from every kind of liability for infringement in
his production for the Government.
7
of the amendment which became section 1498 (quoted on page 721 of the Wood de-
cision) as follows:
This is an amendment of the patent law, and, generally speaking, it would
not be appropriate on the naval appropriation bill. It makes only a slight
change in the existing law, but the urgency and necessity of it was such
that the Senate deemed it proper to place it on the bill. It is strongly rec-
ommended in a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Roose-
velt. The existing law provides that, when the government wrongfully uses
a patent, the remedy of the patentee shall be to sue the government. The
conditions now are such that it becomes necessary for the government to
have contracts with various private manufacturers, and for them to use these
patents where disputes may arise over the use of the patent. Now, if the
government itself is manufacturing, they cannot enjoin the government, but
under existing law must sue in the Court of Claims for the recovery of their
rights under the use of the patent. If a man makes a contract with the
government to perform the work, the patentee can enjoin the private con-
tractor and the private manufacturer from doing the government work.
Now the only change that is made is to provide that the private contrac-
tor, who is doing the government work under contract with the govern-
ment, shall be placed on the same basis, and shall bring suit against the
government of the United States to recover certain compensation from the
use of their patent, or such damage for the use of the patent, as they could
recover if the government of the United States was doing the work itself.
Thereby it would prevent the injunction process from the courts being
used to prevent private manufacturers doing government work. That is
the whole change made in the law, and the conditions are such as to require
that it should be done.
7. Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 343-45; (1928). The
Supreme Court made the following pertinent statements:
The purpose of the amendment was to relieve the contractor entirely
from liability of every kind for the infringement of patents in manufactur-
ing anything for the Government and to limit the owner of the patent
and his assigns and all claiming through or under him to suit against the
United States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and
entire compensation for such use and manufacture. The word 'entire' em-
phasizes the exclusive and comprehensive character of the remedy pro-
vided. As the Solicitor General says in his brief with respect to the Act,
it is more than a waiver of immunity and effects an assumption of lia-
bility by the Government.
The intention and purpose of Congress in the Act of 1918 was to
stimulate contractors to furnish what was needed for the War, without
fear of becoming liable themselves for infringements to inventors or the
1968] PATENT INFRINGEMENT
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For many years after the enactment of section 1498, it was not con-
sidered improper or illegal for the federal contracting agencies to give
patent owners preference in the award of Government contracts. Such
practice was in fact sanctioned by two decisions8 of the Comptroller
General.' It was against the legislative background outlined above, 10
however, that the Comptroller General issued his 1958 decisions in the
Herbert Cooper case which have led to the criticism that section 1498
has been subverted to a Government policy which promotes infringe-
ment of patents and is inimical to and destructive of the public policy
considerations underlying our patent laws.
Herbert Cooper involved a Department of the Air Force contract
for urgently needed requirements. The Department requested the
Comptroller General's consideration of a proposal to reject the low bid
submitted by the Herbert Cooper Company under the formally adver-
tised invitation for bids and then to negotiate a contract with a licensee
of a patent holder submitting a higher bid. The stated purpose of the
Air Force proposal was to enforce and protect the rights of the patent
owners or assignees of patents. The letter of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, upon which the Act of 1918 was passed, leaves no doubt that this
was the occasion for it. To accomplish this governmental purpose, Congress
exercised the power to take away the right of the owner of the patent to
recover from the contractor for infringements. This is not a case of a
mere declared immunity of the Government from liability for its own
torts. It is an attempt to take away from a private citizen his lawful claim
for damage to his property by another private person which but for this
Act he would have against the private wrongdoer ....
8. 13 CoMp. GEN. 173, 176 (1933); CoMP. Gm. B-77738, Jan. 10, 1949. Hereafter,
unpublished decisions of the Comptroller General will be cited simply by B-number
and date.
9. Budget and Accounting Act, S 304, 42 Stat. 24 (1921). See also, 31 U.S.C. §§ 74
82(d) (1964). For information generally concerning GAO's authority and role in
Government procurement see FuNcnoNs oF Trm GENERAL AccoNmNG OFFICE, S. Doc.
No. 96, 87th Cong. (1961); MAcmNERY AND ALLmD PRODucrs INSTrT, The Govern-
mem Contractors and the General Accounting Office (1966); Keller, The Role of the
General Accounting Office, 21 Bus. LAw. 259; Meyer, The Role of the Comptroller
General in Awarding Formally Advertized Government Contracts, 18 AD. L. Rrv. 39
(1966); Shnitzer, Changing Concepts of Government Procurement-The Role and In-
fluence of the Comptroller General on Contracting Officer's Operation, 23 FED. B. J.
90 (1963); Welch, The General Accounting Office in Government Procurement, 14
FED. B. J. 321 (1954).
10. E.g., Hearings on S. 1047, Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., June 1, 2, 3; July 6, 7; Aug.
17, 19 (1965).
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owner and its licensees. However, the Comptroller General rejected
the proposal by a decision dated August 25, 1958.11 Essentially he held
that where procurement by advertised competitive bids is required, the
governing statutes properly may not be construed as eliminating or
restricting competition on behalf of patent owners and their licensees;
that where full and open competition results in a bidder's being required
to infringe patent rights in order to comply with Government contract
requirements, section 1498 explicitly provides the patent owner with
a remedy against the Government for "reasonable and entire compensa-
tion" for the property right taken from him.
In a subsequent letter, the Air Force requested clarification of the
decision of August 25, 1958. The Department urged that the indis-
criminate use of the section 1498 authority "is inimical to and destruc-
tive of the public policy consideration underlying the patent laws" and
that the exercise of such authority should be discretionary as the interest
of the Government may dictate. In his reply of October 6, 1958,1 the
Comptroller General adhered to the view that the military departments
have no authority to dispense with the requirements of formal adver-
tising on the ground that such procedures would tend to impair the
patent system and that the Congress has made no exception to the
advertising statutes in that respect, but rather has provided patent owners
a remedy in the Court of Claims under section 1498.
These conclusions were premised on the view that section 1498 is,
in effect, an eminent domain statute which constitutes a modification
of the patent laws by limiting the rights of patentees, so far as concerns
procurement of supplies by the Government, and by vesting in the
Government a right to use any patent granted by it upon payment of
reasonable compensation.
In reaching these conclusions, the GAO was not unmindful of the
inherent conflict with the public policy considerations underlying the
patent laws and the rights granted to patent owners under those laws.
The Office recognized that it can be argued that general reliance upon
section 1498 to avoid subjecting Government contractors to injunctive
suits for patent infringement conflicts with the declared public interest
in granting patents and in otherwise allowing such suits.
However, it is also in the public interest to provide for the procure-
ment of public needs through full and free competition and to establish
11. B-136916, Aug. 25, 1958 (First Herbert Cooper decision).
12. 38 Comp. GEN. 276 (1958) (Second Herbert Cooper decision).
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multiple sources of supply unhampered by the effects of time-consuming
suits against Government contractors who may or may not be infring-
ing valid patent rights. This seems to have been recognized by Congress
in enacting not only section 1498 but also the federal procurement
statutes. These statutes require award of formally advertised contracts
to the lowest responsible, responsive bidder without providing any
exemption in favor of patent holders."8
Those statutory and policy requirements relating to the necessity of
providing for the placement of certain Government contracts with small
business concerns and in distressed labor areas, should be considered.' 4
Obviously, restriction of contracts to patent owners and their licensees
could conflict seriously with the procedures used in awarding contracts
which are required to be set aside under those programs.
The basic question is, how should these competing policy considera-
tions be resolved to best promote the public interest? The Comptroller
General's decisions in the Herbert Cooper cases are based on the belief
that under present law the overall public interest has been resolved in
favor of reserving to the Government the right to award its contracts
to the lowest responsible, responsive bidder after securing the maximum
benefits derived from full, free, and open competition.' 5 The Comp-
troller General has consistently adhered to the position taken in the
Herbert Cooper decisions in a number of subsequent decisions in similar
cases.
16
In addition, there are strong practical reasons why the Government
should be free to award its contracts for needed supplies and equip-
ment without having to assess the rights of patent owners. To make
such an assessment with any degree of certainty before awarding con-
tracts, the numerous Government procurement offices throughout the
13. Armed Services Procurement Act, 62 Stat. 21 (1948), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§
2301-14 (1964); Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, title III, 63 Star. 393
(1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 251.60 (1964).
14. Small Business Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. 644 (1964), formerly 72 Star. 395 (1958); 32
C.F.R. § 1.700 et seq. (1968); and 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.700 et seq. (1968); Defense Man-
power Policy No. 4, Rev. Oct. 18, 1967, 32A C.F.R. ch. 1 (1968); U.S. Department of
Labor Regs., Rev. Oct. 18, 1967, 29 C.F.R. pt. 8 (1968); 32 C.F.R. § 1.800 et seq. and
41 C.F.R. § 1-1.800 et seq. (1968).
15. See statement of J. Edward Welch, Deputy General Counsel, GAO, made during
Hearings on S. 1047, Before Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 64 (1965).
16. See, e.g, published decisions 46 Comp. GEN. 205 (1966); 40 Corp. Gr. 294
(1960); 39 Comp. GEN. 760 (1960); 39 Comp. GEx. 6 (1960). There are a number of un-
published Comptroller General decisions on this point also.
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country would have to determine first whether there was a valid out-
standing patent covering the items to be procured. Although up-to-
date figures are not readily available, it must be borne in mind that,
despite the presumption that a patent is valid, a large percentage of court
cases in which infringement has been alleged ultimately resulted in de-
terminations that the patents relied upon were invalid.17
In addition to having to determine the validity of alleged patents,
the contracting agencies would be required to decide whether valid
licenses to practice the patents had been issued; whether the use of the
patent would be involved in manufacturing the item being procured;
and finally, whether any such use would amount to infringement of the
patent.
Many procuring agencies do not have the trained technical and
legal staffs to deal with these complex problems and the uncertainties
inherent in making these determinations as they might affect particular
procurements could place an unbearable if not impossible burden on
Government procurement officers.
For all these reasons it seems doubtful that the Comptroller General
could be persuaded to change his views as expressed in the Herbert
Cooper and subsequent similar decisions in the absence of legislative
changes.
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Many patent owners feel that the remedy provided by section 1498
for patent infringement (suit against the Government in the Court of
Claims) is time-consuming, expensive, and inadequate. Therefore, they
feel that GAO should settle claims for patent infringement under Gov-
17. In 1963 (the last year for which the writer has been able to find statistics), the
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals held 53.2% of the patents adjudicated to be invalid.
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT, (Calvert ed. 1964).
For the years prior to 1955, see the statistics relating to invalid patents adjudicated by
the federal courts published in AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., 176-85 (pursuant to S. Res. 92). Also of interest on this point is
Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560,
572 (1949), where he remarked that:
It would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents that have been
granted, improperly I think, and without adequate tests of invention by
the Patent Office. But I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office pas-
sion for granting patents is an equally strong passion in this Court for strik-
ing them down so that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court
has not been able to get its hands on.
[Vol. 10:39
PATENT INFRINGEMENT
ernment contracts in instances where the contracting agency does not
have specific statutory settlement authority. GAO believes that, in
addition to relieving the Government from patent infringement prob-
lems in awarding its contracts for supplies and equipment, section 1498
was designed to furnish patent owners and licensees an adequate and
effective remedy for infringement of their patents by Government
contractors. This was pointed out in the Herbert Cooper decisions.
As was stated in those decisions and as already pointed out, the statute
provides that the patent owner's remedy for infringement by the Gov-
ernment or its contractors shall be by suit against the United States in
the Court of Claims for the recovery of his "reasonable and entire com-
pensation" for such use and manufacture. Although section 305 of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which established the General
Accounting Office, provides that "[a]Ul claims and demands whatever
by the Government of the United States or against it... shall be settled
and adjusted in the General Accounting Office," 18 the Comptroller
General has held that notwithstanding this broad claims settlement au-
thority the GAO cannot properly consider and settle claims for patent
infringement." The Comptroller General's position is based on the
general rule of law that where Congress creates a right and provides a
remedy for enforcement of that right, the remedy so provided is ex-
clusive unless otherwise indicated. He pointed out that the Supreme
Court has stated that the effect of the word "entire" added to the 1910
statute by the 1918 amendment was "to emphasize the exclusive and
comprehensive character of the remedy provided." 2 0
It is significant that certain major executive departments and agencies
have been granted statutory authority to settle patent infringement
claims. These are the Defense agencies,2 the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA),' the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) ,23 and agencies procuring in furtherance of the purposes of the
Foreign Assistance Act.
24
Practical considerations are involved here also. The procedure GAO
18. 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964).
19. B-160745, Feb. 13, 1967, and July 27, 1967; B-149392, Aug. 1, 1962.
20. B-160745, July 27, 1967, citing Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275
U.S. 33 (1928).
21. 10 U.S.C. § 2386 (1964); 10 U.S.C. H9 5151, 7210(a) (1964).
22. 72 Star. 429, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2473(b) (3).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(g) (1964).
24. 22 U.S.C. § 2356(b) (1964).
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would be required to follow to properly consider and settle a patent
infringement claim would necessitate determinations similar to those
mentioned above, plus a further determination as to the extent and value
of the damages, if any, resulting from the infringement. As in the
case of many procuring agencies, the GAO does not have the personnel
with the patent and engineering expertise which would be required to
make such difficult, expensive, and time-consuming determinations.25
PATENT INDEMNIFICATIONS
As protection to the Government in the event of a successful suit
by a patent owner under section 1498, the procuring agencies are free
to require the inclusion of a contract provision under which the con-
tractor expressly agrees to indemnify the Government against liability
for patent infringement. Section 9-103 of the Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulation (ASPR), with certain specified exceptions, re-
quires the use of a patent indemnity clause in construction and supply
contracts "in order that the Government may be reimbursed for lia-
bility for patent infringement arising out of or resulting from the
performance of construction contracts or contracts for supplies which
normally are or have been sold or offered for sale to the public in the
commercial open market or which are the same as such supplies with a
relatively minor modification thereof." 26 A standard patent indemni-
fication clause is prescribed in ASPR 9-103.1 (a).
In the event a military department desires to exempt one or more
United States patents from the patent indemnity clause, ASPR 9-103.4
provides that authority to do so shall first be obtained from the Secre-
tary concerned or his authorized representative. This section also pro-
vides for a Waiver of Indemnity Clause.
ASPR 2-407.8 provides that when a patent indemnity clause is to be
included in a contract, award of the contract shall not be refused to the
low bidder merely because he is not the owner or a licensee under any
of the patient rights which may be involved. The Comptroller General
has gone further. He has held that even though indemnification for
25. In B-160745, July 27, 1967, the Comptroller General stated:
In view thereof, and since we have neither the necessary expertise re-
quired to pass upon the validity of the patent involved nor the requisite
facilities for making a sound judgment as to the alleged infringement and
value of the use of the patent, we feel that such claims properly may not
be considered or settled by our Office.
26. 32 C.F.R. § 9.103 (1968).
[Vol. 10: 39
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patent infringement is not provided for in an invitation to bid, a low
bidder may not be rejected on the basis that the Government might
incur liabilities under section 1498 for patent infringement.
NASA's procurement regulations also prescribe patent indemnity
clauses.28 It appears, however, that NASA does not favor the use of
patent indemnity as a general practice. Apparently, the Agency's ob-
jection is based on the proposition that as a prerequisite to obligating
the contractor to reimburse the Government for an administrative set-
dement with the patent owner, the contractor must consent to the
settlement agreement. In addition, NASA feels that the patent indem-
nity requirement can induce prospective contractors to include a contin-
gency in their bid prices; can serve as a possible deterrent to prospective
bidders in accepting Government contracts under which patent in-
fringement might be necessary in performing the contract; and can
encourage contractors to use second rate materials in order to avoid
patent infringement.2 '
27. 45 Comp. GEN. 13 (1965); 39 Comp. GEN. 760 (1960). The rationale underlying
this position was explained in 45 CoM. GEN. 13, 16 (1965):
Regarding your contention that if patent indemnity is not provided in
the invitation possible patent infringement liability must be provided for
in the evaluation of bids in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2305(c) providing
for consideration of 'price and other factors' in ascertaining the low bid, we
concur with the Bureau that patent infringement liability is not for evalua-
tion in the consideration of bids. The matter of infringement and the ulti-
mate fixing of a reasonable compensation therefor is for ultimate resolution
by the Court of Claims as provided by 28 U.S.C. 1498, with the possible
exception of an administrative settlement under the authority of 10 U.S.C.
2386. Until a settlement is reached the matter is speculative....
28. NASA Procurement Regulation, 41 C.F.R. § 18-9.104 (1968).
29. Letter from the Administrator of NASA to the Comptroller General, June 13,
1966, requesting approval of NASA's proposed licensing procedure, stated:
NASA does not generally include 'Patent Indemnity' clauses in its con-
tracts, since such clauses in NASA's opinion may have the effect of unneces-
sarily increasing contract costs because of the inclusion by bidders of a
contingency factor in their bids; they may discourage prospective bidders
from taking part in procurements because of the uncertainties of infringe-
ment liability; and they may encourage contractors to use second-best sup-
plies and materials to avoid possible infringement liability. Moreover, such
clauses would not be appropriate in contracts involving research and
development, and these, of course, constitute the major portion of NASA
contracts. Finally, an important legal objection to the use of patent indem-
nity clauses stems from the fact that under Martin Co. v. United States,
163 F. Supp. 376 (Ct. Cl. 1958), such clauses make it difficult and in many
cases impossible for an agency to settle a patent owner's administrative
claim for patent infringement. To be obligated to reimburse the Govern-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
AUTHORIZATION AND CONSENT
Because section 1498 refers to the use or manufacture of an inven-
tion "with the authorization and consent of the Government," ASPR
9-102 requires an Authorization and Consent Clause in Government
contracts "to insure that work by a contractor or subcontractor under
a Government contract may not be enjoined by reason of patent in-
fringement." This section further provides that since "an authorization
and consent clause does not detract from any patent indemnification
commitment by the contractor or subcontractor . . . both a patent
indemnity clause and an authorization and consent clause may be in-
cluded in the same contract."
ASPR 9-102.1 sets forth a standard authorization and consent clause
for contracts for supplies (including construction). The clause provides
that the Government thereby gives its authorization and consent for
all use and manufacture in performance of the contract or any sub-
contract thereunder of any invention described in or covered by a
patent of the United States (1) if the Government accepts an item
which embodies an infringement and (2) if infringement necessarily
occurs in complying with the contract or subcontract specifications.
In the Herbert Cooper decisions, the Comptroller General gave con-
siderable weight to the fact that in the procurement under consideration
the Government gave its authorization and consent for patent infringe-
ment pursuant to ASPR 9-102.1. The question can arise, however, as
to the legal effect of omitting the authorization and consent clause from
a contract under which patent infringement reasonably could be ex-
pected to occur. This question was presented in a case considered by
the Comptroller General in April, 1966, which involved a procurement
by the National Bureau of Standards." There the second low bidder,
whose bid was only slightly higher than the low bid, protested against
the award of the contract to the low bidder on the basis that perform-
ance by any other bidder in accordance with the advertised specifica-
tions would infringe on a patent assigned to the second low bidder by
the inventors.
ment for any administrative settlement, the indemnitor must first agree
to the settlement; and it is usually to his advantage not to agree and there-
by force the patent owner into a suit against the Government in the Court
of Claims. In view of these factors, the present NASA policy resulted from
a conclusion that, on balance, across-the-board use of patent indemnity
creates more problems than it solves.
30. B-158790, April 15, 1966.
[Vol. 10: 39
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The Comptroller General stated that ordinarily where there is no
authorization and consent clause in the contract, as was the situation in
that case, the contractor assumes the liability for any delay or damages
resulting from infringement of patents and performance of the contract.
He pointed out, however, that the invitation for bids contained the
"Notice of Assistance Regarding Patent and Copyright Infringement"
clause which is part of Standard Form 32, June, 1964, and under which
the contractor would be required to report to the contracting officer
each notice of claim of patent or copyright infringement and to furnish
to the contracting officer all evidence and information in his possession
pertaining to such suit or claim. The Comptroller General expressed
the opinion that in view of the "Notice of Assistance" clause and the
fact that the Government was on notice of possible infringement, a
court might interpret these circumstances as sufficient to imply au-
thorization and consent by the Government to the contractor's infringe-
ment of the patent. On that basis, the Comptroller General ruled that
there was no valid objection to awarding the contract to the low bidder.
Because this case involved a contract awarded by a civilian agency
of the Government, it brought to GAO's attention the fact that, unlike
ASPR, the Federal Procurement Regulation (FPR)3 did not provide
any instructions for use of clauses providing for the authorization and
consent to infringe patented inventions and patent indemnity in supply
contracts entered into by the civilian agencies. The Comptroller General,
therefore, recommended to the Administrator of General Services Ad-
ministration (GSA) that consideration be given to the issuance of
appropriate regulations to govern the utilization of such clauses. 2
Another case decided by the Comptroller General in 1966 presented
an interesting question concerning the application of the requirement
for the use of the authorization and consent clause.8a That question was
whether it was proper for a contracting agency to expressly withhold
the Government's authorization and consent to infringe a patent under
a Government contract. The case involved a subcontract to be awarded
by a prime contractor of the AEC. AEC proposed to include in the
subcontract a clause which would have withheld the Government's
authorization and consent to infringement. The purpose of the pro-
posed "nonauthorization and consent clause" was to avoid any implica-
31. 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.001 et seq. (1968).
32. GSA advised that these regulations are being issued as chapter IX of FPR, 41
C.F.R. 1-9 (1968).
33. 46 Comp. GEN. 227 (1966).
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tion that AEC was giving its authorization and consent to, or was
encouraging infringement of, patents in performing the subcontract.
The Comptroller General decided that the proposed clause would
have been legally ineffective to shift the liability of an infringement
suit to the subcontractor where the Government obligated itself to
accept a product which would infringe a patent because the assumption
of that obligation by the Government would bring the infringement
within the coverage of section 1498. In reaching this conclusion, the
Comptroller General stated:
Therefore, we conclude that the contractual obligation to ac-
cept a product which may infringe patent No. 3,129,188 is suffi-
cient in itself to provide the Government's 'authorization and con-
sent' for the use or manufacture of a patented invention by the
contractor, and that incorporation of the 'authorization and con-
sent' language in the Royalty Adjustment Act of 1942 into 28
U.S.C. 1498 did not so drastically change pre-existing law as to
provide contracting officers with the option of withholding or,
more accurately, withdrawing the 'authorization and consent'
which the Government actually establishes by its contractual ob-
ligation. We believe this view is supported by the various deci-
sions holding that acceptance of allegedly infringing goods by the
Government is sufficient to bring the alleged infringement within
the ambit of 28 U.S.C. 1498 ....
It is important to note that the Comptroller General drew a distinc-
tion between the situation where the invention would be embodied in
the item to be delivered under the contract and where the invention
merely might be used at the option of the contractor as a means to and
an aid in manufacturing the item. He expressed the opinion that the
question whether a district court would assume jurisdiction of an in-
fringement suit against the Government in the latter situation would
depend upon whether the contractor's alleged use of the patented process
was at his option and for his own convenience, rather than with the
authorization and consent of the Government.
NASA's LICENSING PROCEDURE
Naturally, contractors, industry associations, patent lawyers, and cer-
tain congressional interests agree that unrestricted patent infringement
under Government contracts results in inequities and is damaging to
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inventive industry and the patent system. Some Government agencies
also are sympathetic to the problem of Government contract patent
infringement; but, except for one agency (NASA), they have thus far
been unable or unwilling to take any affirmative action toward solving
the problem.
By a letter dated June 13, 1966, the Administrator of NASA sub-
mitted to the Comptroller General a proposed new approach to the
procurement of patented items. NASA has statutory authority "to
acquire (by purchase, lease, condemnation, or otherwise) ... real and
personal property (including patents), or any interest therein, as the
Administrator deems necessary .... " * Acting under this authority, the
Agency proposed a procedure under which it would secure a license
(a procurement license) from the patent holder in appropriate cases
prior to a NASA procurement of a patented item. A royalty would be
established, payable to the patent holder if the patent were secured from
an unlicensed source. That is, the amount of the royalty would be
added to the prices quoted by the unlicensed bidders. The "procure-
ment license" 'would be applicable only for the single procurement.
This procedure would be invoked only if (1) the contracting officer
had determined that entering into the license agreement would not
unduly delay the procurement; (2) NASA patent counsel were satis-
fied a valid patent right might be involved; and (3) the patent owner
was willing to enter into a license agreement at a reasonable rate prior
to award.
By decision of September 12, 1966, the Comptroller General ap-
proved NASA's proposal with the following statement:
The legislative intent of section 1498 is to assure that the Gov-
ernment will have available to it the resources of private industry
unfettered by private patent rights. See cases collected in the an-
notations to 28 U.S.C.A. 1498. You do not propose to inhibit the
Government's right to solicit all potential sources for Government
contracts. Every firm, whether licensed by the patent owner or
not, would still be free to submit a bid or proposal on a patented
item. Your invitation or proposal would provide, however, that
any agreed-upon license fee would be added to the bid or quo-
tation of an unlicensed supplier for evaluation purposes. This is
not a restriction on competition. Indeed, the proposed evaluation
of the license fee represents perhaps a more realistic approach in
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2473 (b) (3) (1964).
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determining the most advantageous price that exists under the
current procedure where possible infringement damages are not
considered.
. . . [W]e do not object to the issuance of the proposed reg-
ulation for a trial period, leaving resolution of any problems which
may arise for a later date, when experience is gained.35
On October 24, 1966, NASA issued a procurement regulation direc-
tive formalizing the procedure which is now generally referred to as
NASA's "Preprocurement" or "Instant Licensing" procedure. 36  In-
formal inquiry to NASA elicited the information that the procedure
has been found to be appropriate only in a few cases. 7 Also, no other
35. 46 CoMp. GEN. 205 (1966).
36. NASA Procurement Regulation Director 66-10; now NASA Procurement Regu-
lation 9-102, 41 C.F.R. 18-9.102.
37. In a letter of March 26, 1968, to the Comptroller General the Administrator of
NASA reported on the results of NASA's experience during 1967 on the new policy
and advised that NASA planned to continue the trial for at least another year in order
to accumulate additional experience on the effectiveness of the policy. It was reported
that during 1967 NASA considered four specific instances in which a patent owner
requested NASA to become a licensee, and in each NASA determined that it should not
enter into a license agreement. The Administrator gave the following reason why, in
his view, there have been so few requests to NASA for preprocurement licenses:
. . . Basically, NASA's posture as a research and development agency
severely limits NASA's basis for making precontractual determinations of
whether items to be developed in the research effort will infringe a par-
ticular patent. I suspect that patent holders may realize that a preprocure-
ment license will not be available since NASA will be unable to make the
necessary precontractual determinations concerning infringement in these
research and development efforts.
Conversely, I feel that the policy would be applied in more cases if
NASA's procurement requirements dictated that this agency place large
contracts for standardized commercial items, for example, through 'brand
name or equal' procurements. Since procurements of this nature are more
susceptible to precontract determinations of patent infringement and would
undoubtedly provide a broader basis for monitoring the effectiveness of
the licensing policy, NASA requested the comments of several other gov-
ernment agencies on the licensing approach. As you suggested, we con-
tacted the Department of Defense to solicit its views on NASA's procedure.
The question of whether the Department of Defense should implement a
similar licensing procedure was presented to the Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulations Committee in May of 1967, but the Committee deter-
mined at that time that the Department of Defense would not adopt this
policy. We have been informed, however, that the Department of De-
fense will monitor the results derived from our experience. We also dis-
cussed NASA's policy with the General Services Administration; however,
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agency has adopted the procedure. It appears that if the procedure is
a step in the right direction, it is only a short step.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In recent years a number of bills have been introduced in Congress
proposing legislative solutions to the Government contract patent in-
fringement problems. Bill S. 1047 which was introduced in the 89th
Congress by Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., of New Jersey, is
typical of such bills. It would have amended section 1498 of title 28
of the United States Code as follows:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the use
or manufacture by or for the United States of any invention de-
scribed in and covered by a patent of the United States, which
has not previously been held invalid by an unappealed or unap-
pealable judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction,
without license of the owner thereof, unless the Secretary of De-
fense, or his delegate, shall determine in the case of each such in-
vention that the national security of the United States requires
such use or manufacture.
By letter dated June 4, 1965, to the Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, the Comptroller General reported un-
favorably on S. 1047. 8s He stated that GAO adhered to the views
expressed in the Herbert Cooper decisions which the Office believes are
consistent with the congressional purpose and intent of section 1498
and with the cardinal principle that contracts for Government require-
ments based on formal advertising must be awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder.
In mid-1965, the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, under the chairman-
ship of Senator John L. McClellan, held hearings on S. 1047. GAO
representatives testified against the bill for substantially the same reasons
we note from your November 20, 1967, letter to the Northrop Corporation
. . that the General Services Administration has chosen not to initiate
this type of licensing procedure.
In response to NASA's report the Comptroller General stated that he had no ob-
jection to the trial's continuation as proposed and looked forward to receiving NASA's
further report. B-136916, April 15, 1968.
38. B-132729, June 4, 1965.
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as stated in the Comptroller General's report on the bill.3 9 The bill was
never reported and similar bills have not received favorable considera-
tion by Congress.
During the 89th Congress, Congresman Thomas G. Morris of New
Mexico introduced a bill, H.R. 10022, designed to provide more equi-
table treatment to patent holders. That bill would have added the
following negotiation exception to the Federal Procurement Statutes:
A BILL To authorize the negotiation of purchases and contracts
for property and services in situations where it is likely that a
valid claim against the United States for patent infringement will
otherwise be made.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That section
302(c) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949, as amended, is further amended by renumbering para-
graph (15) as paragraph (16) and by adding immediately after
paragraph (14) a new paragraph (15), reading as follows:
(15) For property or services as to which the agency head de-
termines that a valid claim against the United States for patent
infringement is likely to result if the purchase is not made from
or the contract not made with the patent holder or its licensees.
SEc. 2. Section 2304(a) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by renumbering paragraph (17) as paragraph (18) and
by adding immediately after paragraph (16) a new paragraph
(17), reading as follows:
(17) The purchase or contract is for property or services as to
which the agency head determines that a valid claim against the
United States for patent infringement is likely to result if the pur-
chase is not made from or the contract not made with the patent
holder or its licensees.
In his report on H.R. 10022 to the Chairman, Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, House of Representatives, the Comptroller Gen-
eral recommended against favorable consideration of the bill, stating:
Summarizing, we feel that the proposed exceptions for elim-
inating or restricting competition on behalf of patent holders or
their licensees proposed by this bill may adversely affect matters
of basic public policy heretofore established by the Congress.
These include:
39. Hearings on S. 1047, supra note 10 at 64-9.
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1. Maintenance of high standards of full and open competition
2. Establishment of multiple sources of supply to meet na-
tional emergencies
3. Placement of a fair proportion of Government require-
ments with small business enterprises
4. Maintenance of reasonable prices for requirements of ac-
ceptable quality and value
5. Maintenance of adequate safeguards of fair and just deal-
ing and protection against monopolistic and unscrupulous
practices
Consideration of national interests such as these pertaining to
the vast procurement requirements of the Government, in our
opinion, far out-weigh those designed to enhance the interests of
private commercial enterprises at increased cost and expense to the
public. Many inherent advantages are realized by the great num-
ber of firms and industrial enterprises who compete for and ob-
tain a share of Government business. We are not aware, how-
ever, of any cogent reason for granting a preferred position to a
particular firm merely because it is a patent owner or licensee or
because it has a large patent portfolio or extensive license arrange-
ments when competing for Government business as would be
permitted by the amendment proposed by the bill. Nor may it
reasonably be said that an individual inventor would, as a rule,
receive any benefit under the legislative changes proposed.
40
Congressman Morris has since introduced in the 90th Congress a
second bill, H.R. 2898. This bill would require the procuring agencies
to negotiate licensing agreements with patent holders in cases where
it appeared that the proposed procurements might result in the use of
a patent. The agreed upon royalties would be considered in evaluating
the bids received in much the same way as under NASA's "Instant
Licensing" procedure.
Thus far, Congressman Morris' bills have failed to meet with favor-
able consideration in the Congress. However, these and the other leg-
islative proposals referred to, along with the hearings which were held
by the Senate Subcommittee and the promulgation of NASA's licensing
procedure, no doubt have served to focus attention on the problems
discussed in this article and, to some observers, to demonstrate the need
for some kind of remedial action.
40. B-140660, Aug. 25, 1965.
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